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Entangled-state cryptographic protocol that remains secure even if nonlocal hidden
variables exist and can be measured with arbitrary precision
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Standard quantum cryptographic protocols are not secure if one assumes that nonlocal hidden
variables exist and can be measured with arbitrary precision. The security can be restored if one of
the communicating parties randomly switches between two standard protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.65.Ta
It is known that quantum mechanics can be without
difficulty replaced by a nonlocal hidden-variable theory
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Simultaneously,
it is a rather popular belief that an exact knowledge of
nonlocal hidden variables would destroy security of quan-
tum cryptography. In this note we do not want to get
into the crossfire of the discussion if such exact knowl-
edge is possible or not in a hidden-variable theory that is
exactly equivalent to standard quantum mechanics. Per-
haps, the problem we discuss is present only in theories
that are ‘infinitesimally close’ to quantum mechanics. We
are not experts in nonlocal hidden variables and, keeping
in mind that impossibility proofs may only prove our lack
of imagination, prefer to assume the worst possible sce-
nario: Nonlocal hidden variables exist and can be exactly
known to our enemies. We harness the nonlocality as a
means of protection by a simple modification of a quan-
tum protocol. The idea is illustrated on nonrelativistic
Bohm theory, but one can argue that the effect is typical
of all nonlocal hidden-variable theories.
Bohm’s theory in its simplest nonrelativistic version [1]
involves nonlocal hidden variables qj(x1, . . . ,xn, t) that
have a meaning of trajectories. The Schro¨dinger equa-
tion for an n-particle wave function ψ(x1, . . . ,xn, t) is
related by the rule ψ = R exp(iS/~) to the system of
partial differential equations involving Hamilton-Jacobi
and continuity equations
∂S/∂t+
∑n
j=1mjv
2
j /2 +Q+ V = 0, (1)
∂ρ/∂t+
∑n
j=1∇j(ρvj) = 0. (2)
ρ = R2 is the density of particles, vj = ∇jS/mj the ve-
locity if a j-th particle, V = V (x1, . . . ,xn, t) the usual
potential, and Q = −~2
∑n
j=1∇
2
jR/(2mjR) is the so-
called quantum potential. The hidden trajectories are
found by integrating the ‘guidance equation’ dqj/dt =
vj . If the particles are not entangled (and thus not in-
teracting via V ), that is the wave fuction takes the prod-
uct form ψ(x1, . . . ,xn, t) = ψ1(x1, t) . . . ψn(xn, t), then
Q =
∑n
j=1Qj where Qj = −~
2
∇
2
jRj/(2mjRj). Such
particles cannot communicate via the quantum poten-
tial. However, for entangled states the particles do in-
teract via Q even if in the sense of V they are uninter-
acting. Systems described by entangled states are thus
nonlocal: The dynamics of a k-th particle depends on
what happens to the remaining n − 1 particles. What
is important, the influences remain within the entangled
system. The quantum potential is a useful conceptual
tool in this context, but the Bohm theory needs only the
Schro¨dinger and guidance equations.
An eavesdropper (Eve) attempting to read the secret
code via the quantum potential would have to get entan-
gled (in the quantum sense) with the information chan-
nel and would be detected by the usual means, say, an
Ekert-type procedure [14, 15]. If the eavesdropper does
not get entangled, the quantum potential will not carry
the information she needs.
Let us now assume that Eve can know the hidden tra-
jectory q(t) of the particle carrying the key between the
two communicating parties. A Bohmian analysis of spin-
1/2 measurements performed via Stern-Gerlach devices
[4, 5] shows that the knowledge of q(t0) at some initial
time t0 uniquely determines the results of future mea-
surements of spin in any direction ([5], pp. 412-415).
The single-particle schemes of the BB84 variety [16] are
thus clearly insecure from this perspective. To make mat-
ters worse, a similar statement can be deduced from the
analysis of two-electron singlet states described in detail
in Chapter 11 of [5]. If two Stern-Gerlach devices are
aligned along the same direction (0, 0, 1) and the parti-
cles propagate toward the Stern-Gerlach devices of Al-
ice and Bob with velocities v1 = (0,−|v1|, 0) and v2 =
(0, |v2|, 0), respectively, then the results of spin measure-
ments are always opposite (that is why we use them for
generating the key) but are uniquely determined by the
sign of z1(t0) − z2(t0), where the respective trajectories
are q1(t) = (0, y1(t), z1(t)) and q2(t) = (0, y2(t), z2(t))
(cf. the discussion on p. 470 in [5]). The result agrees
with the analysis of [6].
Still, if one looks more closely at the derivation given
in [5] one notices that the two particles interact with
identical magnetic fields. We can weaken this assump-
tion. Following [5] we assume that the time of interac-
tion with the Stern-Gerlach magnets is T , the particles
are identical, their magnetic moments and masses equal
µ and m, and the initial wave functions are Gaussians
2of half-width σ0 in the z directions. We also assume
that Alice’s Stern-Gerlach produces the field B1(q1) =
(0, 0, B0+Bz1) but, contrary to [5], the Bob field is taken
as B2(q2) = κ(0, 0, B0 +Bz2), where κ is a real number
(in [5] κ = 1). Then the velocities in the z direction
(0, 0, 1) read
dz1(t)/dt = ~
2t z1(t)/
(
4m2σ4
0
ε(t)
)
+
(
mε(t)
)
−1
BµT tanh
[(
mσ2
0
ε(t)
)
−1(
z1(t)− κz2(t)
)
BµT t
]
, (3)
dz2(t)/dt = ~
2t z2(t)/
(
4m2σ4
0
ε(t)
)
−
(
mε(t)
)
−1
κBµT tanh
[(
mσ2
0
ε(t)
)
−1(
z1(t)− κz2(t)
)
BµT t
]
, (4)
where ε(t) = 1 + ~
2t2
4σ4
0
m2
. The above formulas differ from
Eqs. (11.12.15), (11.12.16) found in [5] only by the pres-
ence of κ. This apparently innocent generalization has
a fundamental meaning for the quantum protocol. For
reasons that are identical to those discussed by Holland
in his book the signs of spin found in the labs of Alice and
Bob depend on the sign of the term under tanh. How-
ever, as opposed to the case of identical magnetic fields
this sign is controlled not only by the initial values of
z1(t0) and z2(t0), in principle known to Eve, but also by
the parameter κ which is known only to Bob. If |κ| ≫ 1
then the sign of this term is practically controlled by the
sign of κ (recall that the range of z1 is limited by the
size of the Gaussian). Choosing the sign of κ randomly,
Bob can flip the spin of the particle which is already in
the lab of Alice and is beyond the control of Eve. Eve
knows, by looking at z1(t0) and z2(t0), what will be the
result of Alice’s measurement if sign(κ) = +1, and that
if sign(κ) = −1 the result will be opposite. But she does
not know this sign if Bob keeps it secret! It follows that
she gains nothing by watching the trajectory. But Bob
always knows the result of Alice’s measurement due to
the EPR correlations. If he keeps κ > 0 then Alice got
the result opposite to what he found in his lab because
B1 and B2 are parallel; if he takes κ < 0 then both Alice
and Bob find the same number because B1 and B2 are
anti-parallel. And this is sufficient for producing the key.
Let us finally clarify here one point that can be easily
misunderstood at a first reading of our protocol. In the
Ekert protocol we have four settings of experimental de-
vices that are used for testing the Bell inequality: (A,B),
(A,B′), (A′, B), (A′, B′). This part of the data cannot
be used for producing the key. We need one more setting,
say (C,C), that will be used for the key. In our protocol
we have in addition the setting (C,−C). One can even
think of our protocol as a version of the Ekert one but
with two alternative measurements corresponding to the
same observable.
What is important, from the hidden-variable point of
view we can predict what will be the results (for each pair
of particles) of (C,C) and (C,−C) measurements. If the
initial hidden variables are such that the results of the
measurement of (C,C) would yield, say, (C,C) = (+,−)
then a result of (C,−C) is not (C,−C) = (+,+), as one
might naively expect, but (C,−C) = (−,−). It is the bit
of Bob that does not change even though it is Bob who
flips his device! This is how the nonlocality works and
why Eve does not know the key.
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